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NOTES
Expanding the Transnational Scope of Federal
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the
Commodity Exchange Act
During the past two decades, federal courts have confronted an
increasing number of transnational suits alleging violations of
United States securities and commodities laws.' Lacking explicit
congressional guidance, courts have relied upon general foreign relations law to delimit the proper scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction. The courts have relied on two variants of the territorial
principle 2-the conduct test 3 and the effects test 4-which establish
I There has been a prodigious amount of commentary on this topic. See, e.g., Comment, The Transnational Reach of Rule lOb-5, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1973); Note, The
ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Acts, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
137 (1978); Note, Expanding the JurisdictionalBasis for TransnationalSecurities Fraud Cases: A
Minimal Conduct Approach, 6 FORD. INT'L L.J. 308 (1983); Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1976); Note, Extraterritorial Application of
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 -The Implications of Bersch v. DrexelInc. and lIT v.
Vencap, Ltd., 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397 (1976).
2

See

SAHOVIC AND BISHOP, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE: ITS RANGE WITH RESPECT

TO PERSONS AND PLACES, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 311 (M. Sorenson ed.

1968) for a discussion of the five bases of international law: the territorial, nationality,
universality, protective, and passive personality priciples.
3 The Restatement states that:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory, whether or not such consequences are determined by effects of the conduct outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located or a status or other interest localized, in its
territory.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17 (1965).

4 The Restatement states that:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect
within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it
occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory;
and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with principles ofjustice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965).
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limits on a nation's power to regulate transnational conduct. Recognizing, however, that Congress may not have intended its regulatory
schemes to reach to the full extent permissible under international
law, 5 federal courts have considered competing policy rationales to
approximate congressional intent.
The decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Tamari
v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L. 6 is a recent example of the efforts of
the federal judiciary to refine the conduct and effects tests and to
define the policies that support the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. In Tamari foreign plaintiffs alleged violations of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) 7 by a foreign corporation. The Taman
court held that while all contacts between the parties occurred
outside the United States, the execution of transactions on United
States commodities markets as part of the alleged fraudulent scheme
justified the exercise of jurisdiction under both the conduct and effects tests. Such a result, the court stated, effectuates congressional8
intent by preserving the integrity of American commodity markets.
The Tamari court's willingness to accept generalized effects within
the United States as sufficient under the effects test represents an
expansion of the scope ofjurisdiction beyond that recognized in previous cases.
Plaintiffs in Tamari were Lebanese citizens residing in Lebanon.
Defendant, Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., was a Lebanese corporation, wholly owned by Bache and Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation, with its only office in Lebanon. 9 Plaintiffs opened two
commodity futures trading accounts with Bache Lebanon in 1972.10
Commodity futures orders solicited by Bache Lebanon from plaintiffs were sent by wire to its parent corporation in Chicago for execution on Chicago commodity exchanges. I Plaintiffs alleged excessive
5 Subject to constitutional limitations, Congress has the power to prescribe rules
that regulate conduct by non-nationals outside the United States that has domestic consequences. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir.
1945). In the absence of congressional direction, however, "an act of congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall,
C.J.).
6 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 221 (1984).
7 Plaintiffs alleged violations under 7 U.S.C. §§ 6(b)-(c) (1982).
8 Tamari, 730 F.2d at 1108.
9 Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 547 F. Supp. 309, 310 (N.D. Il.

1982),

afd, 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 221 (1984). The Delaware corporation was previously dismissed from the action as a result of arbitration. Id.

10 Tamari, 730 F.2d at 1105.
II Tamari, 547 F. Supp. at 310. The commodity futures orders were sent by Bache
Lebanon to London where the orders were relayed to Chicago via a communications system operated by Bache Delaware. Bache Lebanon contended that it was Bache Delaware
that had sent the orders to Chicago. For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the district

court assumed that Bache Lebanon had sent the wire to Chicago. Id. at 315 & n.8.
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trading and churning of their accounts, 1 2 the making of false representations, reports, and statements to plaintiffs, and a covering up by
13
Bache Lebanon of the "true condition of the accounts."
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied
Bache Lebanon's motion for summary judgment for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The court held that the conduct test was satisfied
because the execution of orders in the United States was a "necessary and foreseeable step" in the alleged fraudulent scheme, and
4
thus, constituted "substantial" conduct within the United States.'
Applying the effects test, the court held that "in a case such as this,
where the challenged transactions involve trading on domestic exchanges, [domestic] harm can be presumed, because the
fraud al5
leged implicates the integrity of the American market."'
On interlocutory appeal, Bache Lebanon challenged the finding
of subject matter jurisdiction.1 6 In a three-part analysis, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court. First, the court determined that although the language of the CEA and its legislative
history do not reveal express congressional intent to extend the provisions of the Act to transnational disputes of the kind at issue, there
7
is no indication that such an extension is proscribed.'
Second, the Tamari court applied the conduct and effects tests to
determine whether subject matter jurisdiction existed under international law. 18 In applying these tests, the court relied on principles
derived from analogous cases involving transnational securities

transactions.' 9 Adopting the conduct analysis of the district court,
the Seventh Circuit found that "[t]he transmission of commodity futures orders to the United States would be an essential step in the
consummation of any scheme to defraud through futures trading on
United States exchanges." 2 0 Applying the effects test, the court held
that in transnational trading on American commodity exchanges,
"the pricing and hedging functions of the domestic markets are directly implicated, just as they would be in an entirely domestic trans12 Black's Law Dictionary describes "churning" in the following manner:
Churning occurs when a broker, exercising control over the volume and frequency of trades, abuses his customer's confidence for personal gain by initiating transactions that are excessive in view of the character of account and
the customer's objectives as expressed to the broker.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 220 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
13 Tamari, 730 F.2d at 1105
14 Tamari, 547 F. Supp. at 315.
15 Id. at 313.
16 Taman, 730 F.2d at 1104. Appeal was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982).
17 Id. at 1106-07.
18 Id. at 1107. "When the question instead is whether Congress intended a statute to
have extraterritorial application, the analysis of legislative intent becomes intertwined with
these principles of foreign relations law." Id. at n. 11.
19 See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
20 Tamari, 730 F.2d at 1108.
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action." 2 1 The result in such cases is that domestic markets are
"artificially influenced," and "public confidence in the markets could
22
be undermined."
Finally, the Tamari court determined that the "assert[ion of] jurisdiction under the conduct and effects rationales" was proper, because "the fundamental purpose of the Act is to ensure the integrity
23
of the domestic commodity markets."
The significance of the Tamari decision, in particular its alternative holdings that subject matter jurisdiction existed under either the
conduct or effects tests, is clear only after an analysis of the cases that
precede it.24 Several earlier decisions indicated that both the conduct and effects tests must be satisfied before subject matter jurisdiction exists, 2 5 but the weight of authority holds that satisfaction of
26
either test is sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
Federal courts have relied most frequently on the conduct rationale in finding subject matter jurisdiction over transnational fraud
cases. 2 7 An early example of the application of the conduct test is
Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment Corp. v. Maxwell. 2 8 In Leasco an American corporation brought an action against predominantly foreign defendants, alleging fraud in the sale of foreign securities on a foreign
market. The Second Circuit found that defendants had made misrepresentations and had used telephone and postal services in the
United States to advance their fraudulent scheme. Further, it found
that the signing of a stock purchase agreement with plaintiff in the
United States constituted an "essential link" in the
fraudulent plan.
29
This conduct was sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
In Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd. 30 United States shareholders in
the defendant Canadian corporation alleged that they were misled by
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.

24 Much of this case law involves litigation under federal securities statutes. But as
the court in Mormels v. Girofinance, S.A., 544 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) observed,
"[s]ecurities cases and principles are used as persuasive aids to interpretation of the CEA."
Id. at 817 n.8.
25 See, e.g., Seizer v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
26 See e.g., Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir. 1983) (conduct test
alone); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 41617 (8th Cir. 1979) (either test); Straub v. Vaisman Co., 540 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1976)
(conduct test).

27 See, e.g., Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983);
Alemano v. ACLI International Inc., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,898, at 27,894 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980);
Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull S.A.,
606 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979); Continental Grain, 592 F.2d 409; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub noma.Churchill Forest Industries,
Ltd. v. SEC, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
28 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.1972).
29 Id. at 1335.
30 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
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corporate directors into believing that another Canadian corporation
would make a tender offer for exchange of securities similar to a previous offer made only to Canadian shareholders. They asserted that
they relied on this misrepresentation and held onto the corporate
stock to their detriment. Noting numerous communications between
plaintiffs and defendant corporation using United States telephone
and postal systems and the ultimate exchange of stock in the United
States, the court held that the conduct test had been satisfied. "If the
incidents listed above are considered in their totality, it is clear that
they were of such significance as to subject defendants to the juris31
diction of the trial court."1
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. 32 and its companion case, HT v. Vencap, Ltd.,33 further refined the conduct test. Bersch was a class action
brought by an American plaintiff on behalf of American and foreign
purchasers of stock in a Canadian investment corporation, alleging
material nondisclosures in a stock offering made outside the United
States. Moving away from the more quantitative "totality" application of the conduct test employed in Travis, the Bersch court established different qualitative guidelines for the determination of
substantiality of conduct in the United States depending upon the
nationality and residence of the plaintiffs. Whereas resident American plaintiffs need not allege conduct by defendants in the United
States of "material importance" in terms of losses suffered, foreign
plaintiffs must allege that "acts (or culpable failures to act) within the
United States directly caused such losses."' 34 In defense of this qualitative division, the court stated:
When, as here, a court is confronted with transactions that on any
view are predominantly foreign, it must seek to determine whether
Congress would have wished the precious resources of the United
States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted
to them
35
rather than leave the problem to foreign countries.

In Vencap plaintiff, a Luxemburg investment trust, brought an
action for fraud against defendant Bahamian corporation. Finding
that conduct in the United States by defendant's agents was in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, the court upheld subject matter jurisdiction. The court admonished, however, that its finding of
jurisdiction "is limited to the perpetration of fraudulent acts them31 Id. at 526 (footnote omitted). A similar quantitative approach was used in Kasser,
548 F.2d 109. This approach seems to be less restrictive than the more qualitative approach used in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.

Bersch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). The less restrictive approach has
been endorsed in Note, Expanding the Jurisdictional Basis for Transnational Securities Fraud
Cases: A Minimal Conduct Approach, 6 FORD. INT'L L.J. 308, 331 (1983).
32 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert denied sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423
U.S. 1018 (1975).
33 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
34 Id. at 993.
35 Id. at 985.
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selves and does not extend to mere preparatory activities or the failure to prevent fraudulent acts where the bulk of the activity was
performed in foreign countries." '36 The policy for allowing jurisdiction in Vencap was to prevent the United States from becoming "a
base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even
'37
when these are peddled only to foreigners."
In HT v. Cornfeld38 foreign plaintiffs brought an action against
American and foreign defendants alleging fraud in the sale of United
States securities not listed on an American exchange. While apparently arranged abroad, the sale was ratified in the United States. Applying the conduct test, the Cornfeld court held that a combination of
the facts that the issuer of the securities was an American and that
the sale was consummated in the United States was sufficient to sup39
port subject matter jurisdiction.
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook40 is the first case involving transnational
securities fraud to adopt the effects rationale for the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. Schoenbaum was a shareholder derivative suit
brought by an American shareholder in Banff Oil Ltd. Banff, a Canadian corporation, had common stock registered on both United
States and Canadian exchanges. Plaintiff alleged that Banff directors
had conspired with two Canadian corporations to sell Banff treasury
stock at a market price that defendants knew did not reflect the true
41
value of the stock.
Although the transaction occurred outside the United States, the
court held that subject matter jurisdiction existed because of the effects of the transaction in the United States. This holding was based
on the belief that Congress must have intended the Securities Exchange Act to have "extraterritorial application in order to protect
domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from
the effects of improper foreign transactions in American
securities. "42
36 Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1018.
37 Id. at 1017.
38 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).

39 Id. at 918. "None of our cases or any others intimate that foreigners engaging in
security purchases in the United States are not entitled to the protection of the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws." Id.See also ContinentalGrain, 592 F.2d 409 (use of mails
and "instrumentalities of commerce" were in furtherance of fraudulent scheme); but see
Fidenas, 606 F.2d at 8 (activities in the United States were clearly "secondary or tertiary,"
where sales of securities by allegedly defrauded plaintiff occurred largely outside the
United States); Mornels, 544 F. Supp. 815 (foreign plaintiff allegedly defrauded by foreign
commodities broker in Costa Rica, with no conduct by the broker in the United States;
failure of U.S. broker to inform plaintiff that foreign broker was not its agent was of a
"relatively minor" and "secondary" nature.).
40 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc),
cert. denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
41 Id. at 204.
42 Id. at 206.
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The Second Circuit limited Schoenbaum in Leasco, 43 indicating
that while international law may give Congress the power to circumscribe foreign activities that have deleterious effects on United States
investors and exchanges, it would be "much too inconclusive.

.

.

to

believe that Congress meant to impose rules governing conduct
throughout the world in every instance where an American company
bought or sold a security." '44 Although the court found jurisdiction
in Leasco under the conduct rationale because of defendant's conduct
in the United States, that court stated that it "doubt[ed] that impact
on an American company and its shareholders would suffice to make
the statute applicable if the conduct had occurred solely" outside the
United States. 4 5 Thus, without defining all the factors to be considered, the Leasco court intimated that not all domestic effects would
satisfy the effects test for subject matter jurisdiction in transnational
securities cases.
In Bersch the Second Circuit attempted to define the types of domestic effects that would be sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs had argued that the ultimate failure of the
Canadian investment corporation, whose stock offering outside the
United States was allegedly flawed by material misrepresentations,
had led to a loss of confidence in American underwriters, a "steep
decline in the purchase of United States securities by foreigners,"
depression of prices on domestic securities markets due to the resulting sale of United States securities by mutual funds controlled by the
Canadian corporation, and an inhibited growth of the offshore investing industry "whereby funds of European investors were channelled

into American

securities

markets." '46

The Bersch court

rejected the notion that because the collapse of the Canadian corporation had an "adverse effect on this country's general economic interests or on American security prices," the effects test was satisfied.
Such generalized effects were held insufficient to confer
jurisdiction.

47

More recently, the conduct and effects tests have been applied
48
to actions arising under the CEA. In Alemano v. ACLI International
plaintiff, a Paraguayan corporation, employed Poppe & Co., a German corporation, to handle hedging operations on a Chicago commodities market. The employee of Poppe engaged ACLI Germany,
43 Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
44 Id.

45 Id. at 1337. It has been suggested that while the Leasco court claimed to find jurisdiction based on conduct analysis, it in fact relied on the effects of fraudulent conduct by
foreign defendants on American plaintiffs. Note, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Acts, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 137, 143 (1978).
46 Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987-88. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
47 Id. at 988-89.
48 [1982-83 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,898, at 27,894
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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a German broker and affiliate of ACLI, an American broker, to arrange the hedging contracts. Limited transactions by ACLI Germany were authorized by plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that Poppe's
employee engaged in unauthorized trading, resulting in substantial
losses to plaintiff that "could not have been
accomplished without
49
ACLI Germany's negligence or assistance."

Because ACLI, the American affiliate, executed the disputed
contracts on United States exchanges and maintained the account
and records in the United States, and because the underlying contracts were in American futures, the Alemano court held that subject
matter jurisdiction existed under the conduct test. 50 The opinion
emphasized that "[p]ublic policy dictates that ACLI should not be
able to evade the responsibility of complying with the rules and regulations of the Commodity Exchange Act by utilizing affiliates based
'5 1
in foreign countries.
In Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co. 5 2 the Second Circuit found sub-

ject matter jurisdiction over a dispute arising under the CEA involving a foreign plaintiff and a domestic commodities broker. The court
held that the sending of a misleading brochure from the United
States to plaintiff and the "far weightier" execution of commodities
contracts on United States commodity markets constituted substantial conduct in the United States warranting a finding of subject matter jurisdiction. 53 The Psimenos court concluded that trading on
domestic commodities markets was substantial conduct in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, 5 4 favorably citing the district court's
decision in Tamari, and indicating that the "lawfulness" of the parent
company's execution of the orders of its foreign subsidiaries "does
'
not cure any prior fraud.

55

Thus, when Tamari was decided, subject matter jurisdiction
would exist under the conduct test where the foreign plaintiff could
successfully allege that the defendant had engaged in conduct in the
United States that was essential to the fraudulent scheme. Generalized effects of the fraudulent conduct within the United States were
insufficient to support jurisdiction under the effects test.
The Tamari decision is consistent with prior applications of the
49 Id. at 27,895.

50 Id. at 27,896.
51 Id. at 27,898.
52 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983).
53 Id. at 1046.

54 The Psimenos court commented:
Just as Congress did not want the United States to be used as a base for
manufacturing fraudulent securities devices, irrespective of the nationality of
the victim, . . . neither did it want United States commodities markets to be
used as a base to consummate schemes concocted abroad, particularly when

the perpetrators are agents of American corporations.
Id.
55 Id.
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conduct test. The execution of commodities contracts on United
States exchanges was the consummation of the alleged fraudulent
scheme. The wiring of orders by Bache Lebanon to its United States
parent, while only a small part of the essentially foreign scheme, was
conduct within the United States that was necessary for the execution of the contract. Because this domestic conduct was essential to
the success of the alleged fraudulent plan, the substantiality test es56
tablished in Vencap is satisfied.
Further, the Tamari facts are analogous to those in Cornfeld, in
which the issuance of securities by an American corporation and the
consummation of the sale of those securities in the United States
were dispositive factors in finding subject matter jurisdiction under
the conduct test. As indicated by the court in Psimenos, securities differ from commodity futures in that "securities often 'can be moved
from place to place, bought, sold, traded or borrowed outside a central market,"' whereas, "a commodity futures contract has no lawful
existence or being independent of the designated contract market
upon which it is traded.' 57 Thus, like the American-issued securities in Cornfeld, the commodity futures contracts in Tamari had situs
in the United States. Combining this situs with the consummation of
the sale in the United States, the finding of subject matter jurisdiction in Tamari is consistent with the Cornfeld criteria.
In Tamari, however, there was some dispute as to who actually
sent the commodity futures orders to the United States. While proceeding on the assumption that Bache Lebanon had sent the orders,
the court recognized that at trial it might be shown that Bache Lebanon's American parent, not a present party to the suit, actually sent
the orders. 58 If this were to be shown, Bache Lebanon would have a
stronger argument that it had not engaged in any conduct, substantial or insubstantial, in the United States.
Thus, on these or other facts in similar cases, the Seventh Circuit should have realized the likelihood that unscrupulous foreign
brokers might attempt to "launder" their fraudulent foreign deals by
having a foreign intermediary send a legitimate order to the United
States. This may be the reason for the district court's application of
the far more demanding effects test to the Tamari-Bache Lebanon
dispute.
The market-distorting effects of the fraudulently* procured orders would be the same regardless of who sent the orders. The primary question is whether those market-distorting effects were
56
57
COMM.
grounds
1979)).
58

See supra note 11 and
Psimenos, 722 F.2d at
Fur. L. REP. (CCH)
sub nom., Wiscope S.A.

accompanying text.
1047 (quoting In re Wiscope, S.A., [1977-80 Transfer Binder]
20,785, at 23,199 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 19, 1979), vacated on other
v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm 'n, 604 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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sufficiently particularized to meet established effects criteria. Bersch
specifically rejected as insufficient any generalized adverse effects on
the American economy, its investors, or its markets. The effects alleged in Bersch, however, did not result from the sales of securities on
United States markets; rather they were the result of the collapse of
an investment conglomerate whose challenged stock offering took
place outside the United States. In Tamari, by contrast, the transactions in American futures on American markets, not the failure of a
foreign corporate empire, resulted in the market-distorting effects.
Thus, as the district court in Tamari properly emphasized, whether
triggered by domestic conduct or conduct outside the United States,
59
the transactions directly caused harm to domestic markets.
The Tamari effects test is thus a modification of the test employed in Bersch. The Tamari decision concentrates not on the generalized nature of the effects, but on the remoteness of such effects
from the alleged fraudulent conduct. While many purely foreign
fraudulent schemes may have indirect adverse effects on American
markets, every domestically executed commodity futures contract
that is executed through fraud may be presumed to have aberrant
effects on domestic markets.
The district court decision in Tamari emphasized that the effects
test must be applied on a case by case basis. It specifically limited its
finding of subject matter jurisdiction to "dispute[s] involving the allegedly fraudulent solicitation of orders for American commodities. ' '60 As indicated in the foregoing discussion, securities, unlike
commodity futures contracts, do not derive their legal existence
from the markets on which they are traded. Consequently, unlike
commodity futures contracts, securities may be traded on a variety of
exchanges, both domestic and foreign.
It remains to be seen whether federal courts will extend the
Tamari effects test to securities fraud cases. Future decisions may
continue to apply the Bersch effects analysis to securities cases, requiring more than the allegation of generalized harm accepted as
sufficient in Tamari. Courts might choose to extend the Tamari effects test only to those cases that involve securities trading on United
States exchanges. 6 1 Even in these cases, however, where the trading
might have occurred on a number of international exchanges, courts
might view transactions on the United States exchanges as merely
59 Tamari, 547 F. Supp. at 313.
60 Id.

61 See Restatement § 416, which states:
(1) Any transaction in securities carried out, or intended to be carried
out, on a securities market in the United States is subject to United States
jurisdiction to prescribe, regardless of the nationality or place of business of
the participants in the transaction or of the issuer of the securities.
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 416 (Tent.

Draft No. 2, 1980).
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fortuitous events. Were courts to so hold, the onus once again could
be put on the plaintiff to particularize detrimental effects in the
United States.
A more expansive extension of the Tamari effects analysis would
be to find subject matter jurisdiction in all cases involving fraudulent
transactions in securities that are traded on both United States and
foreign markets, regardless of the actual trading site. Assuming intermarket communication, aberrant effects on the prices of internationally traded securities would not vary with the market chosen for
the transaction. An extension of jurisdiction would depend on
whether the foreign conduct was a sufficiently direct and foreseeable
62
cause of domestic market distortions.
In determining whether Congress intended the CEA to be enforced in suits involving only foreign parties, federal courts must balance those competing policies that would be likely to influence
congressional intent. First, due respect should be given to the rights
of foreign states to protect their nationals from being subjected to
distant legal actions. One commentator convincingly argued that
this policy for limiting the scope of subject matter jurisdiction has
less force when viewed in terms of the protections afforded foreign
parties by the United States legal system in the form of forum non
conveniens and the minimum contacts requirements of in personam
63
jurisdiction.
Second, the rights of foreign states to regulate the conduct of
their own citizens and corporations must be respected. This policy
recognizes that the regulatory scheme of one state might conflict
with that of another state. The potential for such conflict is exemplified in the growing number of concurrent jurisdiction conflicts involving antitrust laws, where the domestic goals of one nation
conflict with the goals of other nations. 64 Although an international
consensus on the proper scope of antitrust legislation is unlikely to
be achieved, a near consensus exists in the field of commodities and
securities fraud. Since fraud is generally recognized as tortious conduct that all nations have an interest in curbing, the potential for
interstate jurisdictional conflicts is a less compelling reason for refus65
ing to recognize subject matter jurisdiction.
Finally, there is the overriding interest of the United States in
62 See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN
§§ 416(2) & 403(2)(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1980).

RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

63 Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553,

565 (1976).
64 See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). See also Note, Thoughts on ExtraterritorialApplication of the United States Antitrust
Law, 52 FORD. L. REV. 350 (1983).
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maintaining the integrity of its markets. The uniquely domestic
character of commodity futures contracts traded on American exchanges, recognized in both Psimenos and Alemano, means that every
fraud-tainted transaction has a direct, albeit often slight, market distorting effect. Congress designed the CEA to prevent precisely such
distortions.
The Tamari decision establishes an expansive view of the scope
of subject matter jurisdiction where the execution of a commodity
futures contract occurs on a domestic market as part of a transnational plan to defraud. The execution of such a contract by a foreign
defendant on an American market constitutes the consummation of
the fraudulent scheme and is sufficient conduct within the United
States to justify the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction under the
conduct test. Even where the foreign defendant does not engage in
conduct within the United States, if the plan to defraud includes the
execution of contracts on American exchanges, the effects of such
transactions directly implicate the integrity of the exchanges. These
effects, while generalized, may be presumed, and thus, are sufficient
to satisfy the effects test. By emphasizing the degree of remoteness
of the effects from the fraudulent conduct alleged rather than the
generalized nature of the effects, Tamari modifies the effects test
formula established in Bersch.
Future decisions based on the Tamari effects test in which the
use of American commodities markets is alleged will likely focus on
whether the market transactions were a foreseeable part of the plan
to defraud, not on whether the harm suffered in the United States
was sufficiently particularized. More importantly, Tamari may provide an impetus for broadening the scope of subject matter jurisdiction in transnational securities fraud cases in which the integrity of
United States exchanges is implicated.
-ALBERT

DOUGLAS BARNES

